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Abstract
This paper assesses the trade-off between acquiring specialized skills targeted for
a particular occupation and acquiring a package of skills that diversifies risk across
occupations. Individual-level data on college credits across subjects and labor mar-
ket dynamics reveal that diversification generates higher income for individuals
who switch occupations whereas specialization benefits those who stick with one
type of job. A human capital portfolio choice problem featuring skills, abilities,
and uncertain labor outcomes replicates this general pattern and generates a siz-
able amount of inequality. Policy experiments illustrate that forced specialization
generates lower average income growth and lower turnover, but also lower in-
equality.
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1 Introduction
Every occupation requires a different set of skills. Conversely, many skills are useful, to
different degrees, in a wide variety of professions. A literary editor, a corporate lawyer
and a marine biologist all apply related skills involving reading, writing and arith-
metic but in different amounts. Moreover, some occupations appear to more heavily
emphasize a subset of particular skills whereas other professions more or less weigh
skills evenly. Engineers, for instance, are likely to be more specialized than sales reps.
Individuals acquire many of these different skills before entering the workforce at
which point they face the uncertainty of settling on a trade or profession. A college
graduate may, for example, study music but not make it as a musician. Knowing these
risks, students will want to balance their efforts in case their initial target occupation
does not work out. Theywill want to choose the composition of their courses to acquire
a set of skills based on inherent abilities and on their expected payoffs in prospective
professions.
To help assess the impact of occupational matching uncertainty on the range of ac-
quired skills and on earnings dynamics, this paper first establishes panel data evidence
linking labor market outcomes with the fit of an individual’s acquired skill set in their
chosen occupation. The paper then constructs, estimates and assesses a human capital
portfolio choice problem for individuals facing an uncertain labor market.
A precise economic framework is spelled out to discern underlying trade-offs. Stu-
dents who vary in both their innate abilities to learn and in their potential in distinct
jobs will choose their set of skills based on these differences. Coupled with labor mar-
ket uncertainty, these unobservables will also generate idiosyncratic labor market out-
comes. As a result, students targeting the same first occupation are likely to acquire
different portfolios of skills to use in their intended job as well as in their back-up plan.
The skills portfolio decision problem put forward in this paper is used to identify the
roles these different unobserved factors play from detailed information on human cap-
ital choices and labour market histories.
The framework adopted here assumes that agents know from the outset their abili-
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ties to acquire imperfectly substitutable skills. They also receive a signal of their poten-
tial ’fit’ or prospects in a number of occupations. Given this personal information as
well as the expected skill payoffs in each profession, agents choose their human capi-
tal portfolio, that is, the amount of each skill they acquire. After investing in training,
individuals enter their preferred or primary occupation.
Each occupation values all human capital types but to a different degree. Human
capital, expected productivity and the fitness signal in that profession determine initial
pay. As employment continues in an occupation, an agent’s true productivity is at
some point fully revealed. Those with good realizations stay in that job permanently
and earn their true productivity. Those with poor draws try their second best option
again without initially knowing their true quality in the new job. The process repeats
itself until the individual settles in an occupation.
This framework reveals a tension between specialization and diversity.1 Innate tal-
ents and idiosyncratic signals of potential provide an incentive for individuals to spe-
cialize by acquiring skills that reflect their personal circumstances. Students rationally
pursue those subjects in which they show promise and talent. In contrast, the risk of
low productivity draws in each occupation provides an incentive to acquire a more
widely applicable portfolio of human capital skills.
Using the 1980 High School and Beyond (HS&B) survey which has detailed in-
formation from post-secondary transcripts, we quantitatively assess this trade-off be-
tween specialization and diversity. For the most part, students in the US begin to spe-
cialize after high school as they choose post-secondary institutions and then majors.
Minors and elective courses further allow students to tailor a portfolio of skills based
on their innate abilities and their career aspirations. Transcripts in HS&B thus give
empirical measures of human capital portfolios that are used to find the underlying
parameters of the skill distribution, the signals of occupational fit and the technologi-
cal skill use by occupations.
1This familiar tension has long been acknowledged and dates back to Smith (1776).
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The HS&B survey also contains labor market histories for individuals’ early careers
- up to around the age of thirty - that link human capital portfolios to individual earn-
ings and labor market dynamics. Looking at the pattern of earnings, the estimated
model performs well. The estimates of the model are based primarily on matching the
observed human capital portfolios and the pattern of occupational switching. None
the less, simulated data found using these estimates mirror the observed relationship
between portfolio concentration, career switches and earnings.
Targeting and hedging in the portfolios appear to affect earnings in similar ways in
both the simulated and actual data. The model implies that the realized fit in a profes-
sion translates into productivity and hence pay. Agents with more targeted portfolios
who remain in an early career choice experience higher earnings and earnings growth.
Workers with more versatile portfolios who switch earn more than switchers with spe-
cialized portfolios. Those who settle early, that is those who realize better first draws,
receive high and rapid growth in earnings. Those who switch encounter an immediate
earnings decline. Similarly, those who settle early tend to earnmore than those who try
several professions. Occupational mobility also declines and the earnings distribution
fans out over time.
As the model and data are close along several dimensions of interest, it is natural to
consider policies that shape the hedging decision. We find that a European-style edu-
cation system characterized by mandatory specialization in an occupation generates a
lower degree of turnover, lower earnings growth, and lower variance of (log) earnings.
An alternative system that allows for more breadth and hedging opportunities (the US
higher education system) trades off higher growth rates in earnings for a more unequal
income distribution.
These results extend the human capital literature with uncertainty. The early hu-
man capital literature developed to understand earnings over the life-cycle, Becker
(1994) or Ben-Porath (1967), focused on investments in homogeneous human capital.
Subsequent contributions added uncertainty about future rewards. Levhari and Weiss
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(1974) and Altonji (1993) are two prominent examples. More recently, Wasmer (2006)
as well as Gervais, Livshits, and Meh (2008) study from a theoretical perspective the
trade-off between (more risky) specific and general human capital during periods of
aggregate “turbulence”.2
A parallel literature considers multi-dimensional endowments of abilities which
determine self-selection of individuals into different sectors, as in Heckman and Sed-
lacek (1985) and Heckman and Sedlacek (1990), or occupations, as in Willis (1987).
These studies formalize the static Roy (1951) model of comparative advantage and
occupation selection.3 Keane and Wolpin (1997) use a dynamic Roy framework to es-
timate a structural model of a joint schooling and occupational choice decision. In the
Keane andWolpin’s framework, individuals have an initial endowment of occupation-
specific abilities (including an ability level to accumulate human capital) and they con-
trol their schooling and occupational choice to maximize lifetime earnings.4 See also
Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) and Yamaguchi (2012) who extend that literature by
redefining occupations as bundles of tasks and exploring the pattern of mobility of in-
dividuals across occupations. Employing a similar framework Sanders (2011) analyzes
the interaction between learning about one’s abilities and occupations transitions. Fi-
nally, Arcidiacono (2004), Kinsler and Pavan (2012) study to what degree the different
observed rates of return of alternative majors can be explained by selection into majors
and jobs. The focus of these studies is not an optimal portfolio choice motivated by
uncertainty about occupational fit and its implications for earnings dynamics. 5
Other papers on occupational and job turnover emphasize the importance of learn-
2An empirical literature has developed to evaluate the degree of mismatch between occupations and
the choice of major or field. Malamud (2010) and Robst (2007) are two examples in this extensive liter-
ature. Malamud examines the relationship between the timing of the choice of field and the likelihood
of working in an unrelated occupation. Robst explores the wage effects of the distance between field of
study and occupation.
3Lazear (2009) and Schoellman (2010) are more recent examples of works that share some elements
with that earlier literature.
4Other studies in the literature of occupational choice include Sullivan (2010) and James (2011).
5For an overview of studies on human capital with an emphasis on its multi-dimensional nature, the
reader is referred to Sanders and Taber (2012).
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ing through the acquisition of information after individuals enter the labor market.
Jovanovic (1979) and Miller (1984) follow up and formalize to some extent the nar-
rative approach of Stigler (1962). Miller’s model of the labor market is close to the
one employed here, although he abstracts from human capital investment. The dis-
tinguishing feature of Miller’s framework is the sequential revelation of information
as individuals try new occupations or careers which generates a trade-off between ex-
ploring new occupations and exploiting the current one. More recent work includes
Antonovics and Golan (2012) who study the tradeoff between information and wages
in a model of occupational choice. They use a model of job choice to infer how much
information different occupations reveal about workers’ productivities. 6
Finally, a substantial literature studies the nature of shocks that individuals experi-
ence over the life-cycle and the cross sectional inequality in earnings that these shocks
generate. Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) investigate whether shocks experienced
over the life cycle or differences established early in life determine the bulk of cross-
sectional earnings inequality. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) explore the link be-
tween the rise in occupational mobility and the rise in earnings inequality. That link is
also central to our work here, so much so that restrictions to the choice of human cap-
ital in the model generate a lower degree of occupational mobility and a more equal
distribution of earnings. Lifting those restrictions overturns the results.
This paper contributes directly to these literatures by considering the choice of the
optimal mix of skills under occupational uncertainty. It examines the interaction of
that choice with the information revealed as labor market histories unravel and their
consequent effect on occupational transitions. The framework and empirical evidence
presented provide a new way to analyze the dynamics of occupational switching, la-
bor earnings and the accompanying inequality that arises during the early years of
6Neal (1999) studies workers’ decisions in the early stages of their labor market careers emphasizing
the two-stage nature of their search strategy. Individuals first settle on an occupation or career path.
After this decision has been made, they start shopping for better jobs. This two-dimensional search
leads to a large amount of turnover among the young explored in detail by Topel and Ward (1992).
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individuals’ life-cycles.
2 Preliminary Evidence
2.1 Data
This section examines the observed empirical relationship between portfolios of hu-
man capital acquired through formal post-secondary education and the dynamics of
labor market earnings observed in the 1980 Sophomore Cohort of the High School and
Beyond (HS&B) survey. This panel dataset contains a rare, if not unique, combina-
tion of information on post-HS credits obtained in different areas of study as well as
information on post-training labor market histories.7
The HS&B survey, conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics, inter-
viewed a nationally representative sample of high school students who were sopho-
mores in 1980 once every two years between 1980 and 1986 and once again in 1992.
For each student/worker, these interviews recorded labor market outcomes in em-
ployment, earnings and occupation that individuals experienced from the first year
after graduation until the last year of the panel (1991).
The labor market data from the survey were merged with information about post-
secondary credits in different fields found in the Post-Secondary Education Data Sys-
tem (PETS). PETS contains institutional transcripts from all post-secondary institutions
attended for a sub-sample of students present in the survey. These high quality, admin-
istrative data provide the measures of human capital diversification used here.
The initial HS&B survey contains 14,825 students. A sub-sample of 8,325 students
had their transcripts encoded. Most students, however, never earned an advanced
degree. To focus on the make-up of portfolios rather than on differences in the levels
of human capital acquisition, the sample is further restricted to those students who
7Given that we do not observed the amount of hours worked, throughout the study the terms earn-
ings, wage and income are all used to denote the same concept: compensation for labor in a given
period.
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earned at least an associates degree, but no more than a one-year masters degree. This
restriction yields a sample of about 1,360 students.
Graduation dates (years) differ across students as do the initial dates and length
of observed labor market histories. For histories to be sufficiently long to generate
at least two years of labor market data for all individuals, we dropped students who
graduated in 1988 or later. In the sample, roughly 70% of students graduated from
higher education in 1988 or before. Further cleaning of the data yields a final sample
of 920 students.8 The Appendix provides a step-by-step description of the cleaning
process as well as other data-related issues including details on the construction of
human capital portfolios.
Human capital portfolios, calculated from transcript credits, contain three areas or
components of study. PETS groups credits into (i) quantitative and scientific courses
including engineering and computer science, (ii) humanities including history, foreign
languages, fine and performing arts,9 and (iii) social science, business and communi-
cations. Credits in sub-categories (e.g. in fields such as biology, literature, sociology
and so on) are available but not used. Using these more refined data not only drasti-
cally increases computational complexity, but also lowers the reliability of classification
given the widespread existence of overlapping fields. Raw credits are weighted by a
student’s GPA (a standard measure of performance) in a particular area of study.10
Given (weighted) credits in each area or type of human capital k = 1, ...K, the
weights in the human capital portfolio of an individual i readily follow as:
ωi,k =
Creditsi,k
∑
K
j=1 Creditsi,j
,
where K = 3. Table 1 displays these portfolio weights by occupation and overall across
8Due to the confidential nature of the data we must report all sample sizes rounded to the nearest ten
whenever we are reporting a statistic.
9The PET data report figures separately for fine and performing arts. These figures are small and
therefore combined with humanities in this study
10Using unweighted credits does not materially affect this analysis.
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the population. For each broad occupation category, the table displays the mean and
the standard deviation of the distribution, across individuals, of the weights in each of
the three human capital types.
Table 1 reveals substantial variation in the average human capital investments across
occupations. The mean weight on humanities varies from fairly low values in Engi-
neers (0.10) and Computer Related Technicians (0.14), to values of roughly half for Pro-
fessional of the Arts. It is not surprising that Engineers have the highest mean weight
in quantitative human capital (0.76), whereas this area of study represents barely 13%
of the portfolios of Professionals of the Arts. Business owners and sales profession-
als have the highest shares of business and communications human capital, allocating
about half of total credits on average, to this component.
Substantial variation also appears across portfolios within particular occupations,
although the extent of within group variation in portfolios differs considerably. Engi-
neers appear more homogeneous than Computer Related Technicians (Tech. Comp)
or Medical Professionals (Prof.Medical). The standard deviation of their quantitative
human capital weight is only 0.15 which produces a relatively small coefficient of vari-
ation. In contrast, the average weight in the quantitative area for Computer Related
Technicians is somewhat smaller but the standard deviation nearly doubles.
Each student i has a vector of human capital weights ωi,k, k = 1, ...,K in the K = 3
components measuring the weight of skill of type k in the overall portfolio. Viewed
on its own, a skewed or balanced portfolio does not imply specialization or diversity
of human capital investments. Students may opt for a uniform allocation of credits
across fields to self-insure against shocks or because a particular occupation explicitly
rewards balanced skills. To assess howwell tailored an individual’s acquired skill set is
for a particular job, human capital investments must be viewed relative to a benchmark
in that occupation.
There are several potential approaches to (as well as difficulties in) measuring how
well suited a given set of acquired skills is to a particular occupation. This paper adopts
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a simple if crude measure. Suppose individual i enters the labor market with human
capital vector (ωi,1, ...,ωi,K) and first works in occupation j. The degree of hedging, δ,
for this particular individual - occupation pair is defined as the standard Euclidean
distance in RK that i’s portfolio lies from the average portfolio observed in occupation
j :
δ =
√√√√ K∑
k=1
(ωi,k − ω¯j,k)2
where ω¯j,k denotes the typical (or average) portfolio for occupation j observed in Table
1. A portfolio is tailored to a given occupation if that portfolio is “close” to the average
portfolio of that occupation. Hedging is simply the distance between the portfolio
weights and the typical portfolio of the first occupation after graduation.
The upper panel of Table 2 displays summary statistics describing the distribution
for this measure as well as for five other relevant variables. log(Y91) denotes (logged)
earnings level observed in 1991, deflated by the CPI. ∆Y denotes the average annual
growth rate of earnings for individuals as given by
∆Y = elog(Y91/Y1)/(T−1) − 1,
where Y1 denotes earnings (deflated for the appropriate year) in the first year after
graduation and T the time in years of individual labor market history. CRED denotes
the total number of raw credits, andWCRED denotes credits weighted byGPA. Finally,
STAY is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual never switches
occupations and equals 0 otherwise.11
For this sample of students, the measure of hedging, δ, displays considerable dis-
persion across individuals. The standard deviation is 0.16 for a variable that ranges
between 0.018 and 0.848, has a mean value of about 0.2, and is bounded between zero
and one.
11 The figures given in Table 2 correspond to a distribution of individuals truncated to eliminate the
top and bottom 2% of average earnings growth.
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Real earnings growth per year in this sample averages about 7.7% with dispersion
in line with other studies. Since retrospective surveys frequently suffer from a large
degree of measurement error, we compared the earnings distribution for the years in
our HS&B sample to a similar sample from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and
found that the two samples are similar. The Appendix reports the results of this com-
parison. 12
As the majority of individuals in our sample achieve at most a bachelor’s degree, it
is not surprising that the median of the distribution for college credits (CRED) is 122.
Some high-achievers take over three hundred credit hours, but these are the exception
as the standard deviation for this measure is only 27. Finally, note that a little over
60% percent of individuals never switch occupations during the observed labor market
histories.
The lower panel of Table 2 provides the raw correlations between these measures.
Most of these correlations are significant as well as plausible. For instance, there is a
strong (unconditional) negative relationship between earnings growth and remaining
in the same occupation. The positive relationship between hedging and the number
of credits taken hints at the possibility of individuals diversifying by adding credits
rather than by transferring credits across areas. It seems sensible that the higher the
degree of diversification, the higher the probability an individual switches occupations
as reflected in the negative correlation between δ and STAY. On the other hand, note
that the unconditional correlation between income growth and hedging is near zero
and insignificant.
12It would be useful to control for hours worked and get a measure of earnings per unit of time but
this is only partially feasible. Although the survey reports the monthly unemployment history (which
we account for in our measures), it does not contain hours worked during the periods of employment
or whether employment is part-time or full-time. As a result, some extreme values, for example, the
minimum observed of −0.219 could be due to voluntary changes in hours worked because of health,
family or other reasons. In what follows, it is very difficult to discriminate among possible causes for
those fairly extreme earnings changes.
10
2.2 Empirical Regularities
Interesting patterns emerge once one conditions on occupational switches. To investi-
gate the empirical regularities beyond raw correlations, Table 3 presents OLS regres-
sion estimates linking the observed final earnings, log(Y91), and the portfolio distance
measure, δ.13
The first column of results reports regression coefficient estimates of (log) earnings
with three further controls - the logarithm of the respondent’s initial earnings log(Y1),
14
the logarithm of the total of credits, log(CRED), and the individual’s gender, SEX. All
four variables’ coefficients are significant with the expected sign. On average, male
earnings are higher than women’s earnings. Individuals with more credits also expe-
rience higher income. The coefficient on initial wages is positive.
With only these three added controls, the relationship between income and hedg-
ing is negative and associated with a large standard error. On average, individuals
who have portfolios close to the average in their initial occupation (i.e. portfolios with
limited hedging) experience higher earnings. From the adjacent column, these results
change very little after adding the control STAYwhich accounts for occupation change.
Those who never switch occupations tend to earn less (the estimated coefficient equals
−0.050) but there is a fairly large amount of uncertainty around that value (the p-value
is 18.6%). The negative estimated coefficient implies negative returns to occupational
tenure, which would appear to contradict some previous findings in the literature.15
Some occupational transitions are primarily lateral moves for people who want to
13The division of human capital into three types of skills is obviously not the only one possible. To
assess the sensitivity of the empirical results to an alternative division, we considered four types, with
humanities and fine arts representing two different categories. The results are very similar to those
obtained with three types of skills and for that reason reported in an appendix.
14Initial earnings are denoted by log(Y1) since the first year of a labor market history is individual-
specific and does not correspond to a unique calendar year.
15See, for example, Kambourov andManovskii (2009). However, Groes, Kircher, andManovski (2009)
note that not all occupational switches are created equal. Movements to occupations higher in the hi-
erarchy (e.g. managerial occupations) should be associated with increases in earnings. Using Danish
data they find that the best-performing and the worst-performing workers in an occupation are more
likely to switch than those in the middle. Below we show that our data confirms that some occupational
switches (e.g. those that end in managerial positions) are associated with increases in earnings.
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or are induced to do something else. Some job changes are natural progressions up a
career ladder. To control for the more vertical (as opposed to horizontal) moves, the
third column of results includes a dummy variable, CAREER, which equals one for oc-
cupational switches (only comparing the first and last period in an individual’s labor
market) that end in managerial positions either from sales, clerical, or other profes-
sional occupations and zero otherwise. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient of
CAREER is positive and the estimate for STAY becomes small and insignificant.
The last column of Table 3 offers interesting evidence on portfolio hedging. This
regression specification includes an interaction term between occupational switchers
and the diversification measure, δ× STAY. The effects are intriguing. The coefficient
on this interaction term is negative, significant and large (−0.38) implying that indi-
viduals who do not switch occupations and who have portfolios close to those found
in the first occupation have on average higher earnings growth. Moreover, since the
coefficient on δ itself switches signs and turns positive (0.164), it appears that if an in-
dividual switches occupations (STAY = 0), a flexible portfolio pays off. A portfolio
further away from the average portfolio of the previous occupation is associated with
a higher growth rate in earnings. Although the p-value is fairly large (11.5%) hence the
degree of uncertainty in this estimated coefficient is large, these results are informative
given the sample size and the relatively higher number of “stayers.” Note as well that
the coefficient on STAY becomes positive (0.112) with a fairly small p-value of 1.8%.
On average higher earnings occur for those that remain in an occupation once we take
into account their portfolio diversification.16
Finally, Table 4 reports results from a Probit model with STAY as the dependent
variable. Recall that variable takes the value one if the individual never switches oc-
cupations and zero otherwise so these estimates relate to occupational mobility. In all
four specifications of the controls, the relationship between hedging and the proba-
16 The pattern of these regressions is robust. It remains unchanged if we use unweighted credits or
alternative measures of mismatch in the initial occupation. Likewise, the pattern remains the same if
income growth is used as the dependent variable.
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bility of an occupational transition is negative. In other words, the further away an
individual’s portfolio is from the average portfolio of his first occupational choice, the
more likely they are to switch to a different occupation. Women are on average more
likely to switch but the relationship between the two variables is weak (the p-value is
0.76). Individuals with a larger number of credits are more likely to stay in their first
occupational choice, as are individuals who start with relatively high initial earnings.
3 The Portfolio Problem
The results presented above suggest that specialization as well as risk diversification
are important considerations in determining the acquisition of job market skills and the
subsequent labor market experience. A more thorough empirical assessment requires
a more fully specified economic framework. This section therefore presents a decision-
theoretic model in which individuals optimally choose a vector of skills, or human
capital types, when future occupational fit is uncertain.
3.1 Environment
Suppose individuals with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) live for an infinite number of dis-
crete periods, t = 0, 1, 2, .... Individuals choose their human capital investments, i.e.
their set of individually distinct skills, in the initial period (t = 0) to optimize expected
discounted lifetime earnings. There are K skills that can be employed in J occupations.
All occupations value all skills but to different degrees. Denote an individual portfolio
of skills by h = {h1, ..., hK}.
Individuals are well aware of their individually specific ability to accumulate or
invest in the different skills that make up their skill portfolio. Before choosing h, an
individual draws a vector of abilities for each type of human capital, ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξK)
from F(ξ). The element ξk represents an individual’s capacity to accumulate skill of
type k. The total cost (in utils) of investing in an individual’s portfolio is given by
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C(h, ξ) : R2K → R which is increasing in the size of the human capital stock, decreas-
ing in the level of each ability, convex and twice differentiable.
Individuals also know the payoff structure of each occupation. They are well aware
of the technology that maps a human capital portfolio into earnings. They are, how-
ever, unsure about an idiosyncratic component of labor market payoffs. Before choos-
ing h, individuals receive a noisy signal of their fit in each occupation - they draw
a vector θ = (θ1, ..., θJ) from the distribution G(θ). Each element θj is an uncertain
indication about an individual’s future productivity in occupation j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Once an individual has acquired the skill set h, they enter the labor market in the
next period t = 1. At this point, workers are unable to update or modify their mix of
skills. Individuals’ only choice in the labor market is to decide in which occupation
to work. They can work in only one occupation in a period. Although individuals
have a general idea before they invest in their portfolio of skills of how well they are
likely to fit into a given occupation, it is only after they complete training and after
they work for a while in a particular job that their true fit in that profession becomes
known. Actual experience in an occupation reveals an individual’s true match quality
or future productivity in that occupation.17
Acquired skills, productivity signals and labor market experience determine payoff
flows. Assume that the first time individuals try an occupation, they start in a proba-
tionary phase during which they get paid according to their noisy signal. In particular,
if an individual who has skills h along with signals θ decides to work in occupation j
for the first time, the flow payoff or earnings equals eθj f j(h). The function f j : R
K → R
is a constant returns to scale technology that maps a given portfolio of skills into earn-
ings. We allow this technology to differ by occupation, hence the subscript j.
An individual completes the probationary phase in occupation j with probability
π at the end of each period. When this phase stops, the worker’s productivity gets
17We use the term productivity or match-quality interchangeably. This term corresponds to the com-
ponent of earnings in an occupation unaccounted for by the individual’s portfolio of skills.
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updated by adding to the θj signal an independent random shock ǫj drawn from a
distribution Γj. Should an individual decide to remain in that occupation after ending
probation and learning their true productivity, earnings then begin to grow at a gross
rate of γ > 1, with βγ < 1.
Information revelation is thus sequential. At each point in time, individuals decide
whether to remain in their current occupation or to continue exploring new occupa-
tions. Exploration enlarges the information set as individuals learn about their match-
quality. This setup is a classic multi-armed bandit problem in which the exploration
of an arm (an occupation) comes at the expense of obtaining payoffs, that are perhaps
larger, in alternative arms.18
3.2 The Individual’s Problem
Let V(θ, h,Φt) denote the expected labor market payoff to an individual with skills
h, productivity signals θ, and labor market history Φt at date t. An individual with
known abilities vector ξ therefore chooses a set of skills in period t = 0 to solve19
max
h
−C(ξ, h) + βV(ξ, h,∅).
Given skills, signals and history, V(.) is the maximum discounted expected lifetime in-
come that the individual can attain when the only action available is whether to switch
occupations. In period t = 0, the worker has not yet entered the market so that Φ0
is the empty set. In subsequent periods, labor market histories consist of occupations
chosen in previous periods along with the realized draws of true productivity or fit in
those occupations:
Φt = {(js, ǫjs)}
t−1
s=1.
18Early economic applications of the classical multi-armed bandit model includeWeitzman (1979) and
Miller (1984). More recent examples include Papageorgiou (2009) and Papageorgiou (2011).
19For the sake of clarity, we do not subscript every function by an i. It should be understood that
except occupation-specific technologies and the cost function, all other objects are specific to an individ-
ual.
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where the ǫjs appropriately convey if and when the probationary phase in occupation
j finished.
Expected earnings in the labor market, V, can be written recursively given the ap-
propriate choice of occupation:
V(θ, h,Φt) = max
jt∈{1,...,J}
wjt(θjt , h,Φt) + πβEǫjtV(θ, h,Φt+1) + (1− π)βV(θ, h,Φt+1),
where wj(θj, h,Φt) is the immediate flow payoff in occupation j given skills and his-
tory. The notation makes clear that recalling previous occupations is allowed.20 Let
ηj(Φt) denote the number of periods an individual worked in occupation jwith knowl-
edge of her true productivity. Recalling that after acquiring that knowledge, earnings
grow with experience in an occupation and that the fit in an occupation does not vary
over time after learning takes place, (ǫjt = ǫjt′ if jt = jt′ and ηj > 0 at t, t
′) the flow
payoff in a period can be written as
wj(θj, h,Φt) =

 e
θj f j(h) i f ηj(Φt) = 0
eθj+ǫj f j(h)γ
ηj(Φt) i f ηj(Φt) > 0.
Repeated sampling of a given occupation provides no new information about al-
ternative occupations. If probation has not ended, i.e. learning has not taken place,
the employer and employee both know θj and h, but neither knows ǫj. As a result,
individual pay reflects only the noisy signal and human capital. After the individual
has completed probation and learned her true fit, the flow payments equal the true
productivity - determined by the signal θj and updated with ǫj - which grows with
occupation-specific tenure at rate γ > 1. This update becomes part of the individual’s
information set whether or not they decide to remain in occupation j.
20The expression does not include an expectations operator if the probationary phase does not end.
In this case, the notation emphasizes and makes clear whether learning occurs in the history Φt+1.
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3.3 Switching versus Staying
The optimal portfolio choice involves computing the expected discounted value of
earnings after entering the labor market, given by V(θ, h,∅). Policies controlling oc-
cupational choice, jt, determine the realization of potential outcomes over time and
reflect a trade-off between exploring new occupations - therefore obtaining informa-
tion about fit - and exploiting the current occupation where payoffs are known.
This exploration versus exploitation trade-off is characteristic of multi-armed ban-
dit problems. Arms correspond to occupations with individuals sampling at most one
arm per period. Gittins and Jones (1972) reduce the dimensionality of bandit problems
by demonstrating that the solution to these problems takes the form of an index policy.
They formulate the so-called Gittins index which assigns a value to each option that
depends only potential outcomes in that option. The chosen occupational choice is the
option with the highest index.
Whittle (1982) reformulates this approach in such a way that the index reflects a re-
tirement value for each choice. Following Whittle’s approach, the Gittins or retirement
index for an occupation in which true productivity is known (the individual completed
probation) is simply the lifetime value of income in that occupation:
Mj(θj, h,Φt) = γ
ηj(Φt)wj(θj, h,Φt)/(1− βγ)
= eθj+ǫj f j(h)γ
ηj(Φt)/(1− βγ) f or ηj(Φt) > 1
On the other hand, if productivity in occupation j is unknown because it has either
not been tried or because the true productivity has not yet been revealed, the index
must account for the unresolved uncertainty. In general, the index is given by
Mj = sup
τ
(1− β)
{
E
[
τ−1
∑
t=0
βtwj(θj, h,Φt) +
βτ
1− β
Mj
]}
where τ is a stopping rule that is contingent on the sequence of events or draws in
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occupation j.
Recall that with probability π, all information about true productivity in occupation
j is revealed in each period of probationary employment in j. Once the true produc-
tivity is revealed, there is no further learning and workers will choose to either move
to another occupation or remain forever in j. Hence once productivity is revealed,
τ ∈ {1,∞}. On the other hand, if learning does not occur, workers face the same
problem as the previous period. Given that wage growth through γ does not occur
until productivity is found out, the decision is stationary. The Gittins index therefore
reduces to
Mj = (1− β)
[
(1− π){eθj f j(h) + Mj}
+πEǫj max
{
eθj f j(h) +
β
1− β
Mj, e
θj f j(h) +
βγ
1− βγ
eθj+ǫj f j(h)
}]
Given this simple choice, a simple reservation value for revealed productivity de-
termines continuation in occupation j. Let ǫRj denote the critical value of ǫj that equates
the two options. With an ǫRj draw from the distribution Γj, the individual is indifferent
between retiring from j and remaining permanently:
(1− β)eθj f j(h) + βMj = (1− β)e
θj f j(h) +
βγ(1− β)
1− βγ
e
θj+ǫ
R
j f j(h)
which yields
ǫRj = ln
(
(1− βγ)Mj
(1− β)γ f j(h)
)
− θj
This reservation cutoff does not depend on the probability of learning except through
the Gittins index Mj. Plugging ǫ
R
j into (1) and manipulating gives
Mj(θj, h,Φt) =
(1− β)eθj f j(h)
(
1− βγ + βγπ
∫ ∞
ǫRj
eǫdΓj(ǫ)
)
(1− βγ)[1− β+ βπ(1− Γ(ǫRj ))]
f or ηj(Φt) = 0
which can be solved, at least numerically, given a parameterization Γj and f j.
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Proposition 1: Suppose updates to the productivity signals are bounded above and
below such that ǫj ∈ (ǫ,ǫ) ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. For any set of signals, skills and histories
(θ, h,Φt), occupational choice jt solves
jt = argmax
j
{M1(θ, h,Φt), ...,MJ(θ, h,Φt)},
The occupational choice problem is a comparison of reservation values for each occu-
pation. The payoffs are the values that make the worker indifferent between continu-
ing with an occupation or receiving the reservation payoff.
4 Model Estimation
To quantitatively assess the model, assume there are K = 3 human capital or skill
types, labeled Humanities (H), Quantitative (Q), and Social Science (SS). Assume the
number of occupations equals J = 12. These skills and occupations correspond to the
HS&B variables described in Section 2.21
To keep the model parsimonious, we assume that occupational signals θj and the
productivity updates ǫj are all independent and distributed normally
θj ∼ N(0, σθ) j = 1, ..., 12
ǫj ∼ N(0, σǫj) j = 1, ..., 12.
Note that we assume that the occupational signals θj all have the same variance as well
as mean.
21 To lower the number of parameters, we eliminate individuals who are listed as Owner, due to the
low number of respondents with Owner as their first occupation.
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The abilities vector ξ is distributed as,
ξ ∼ N(0,Σξ)
The off-diagonal elements of Σξ are all assumed to have the same covariance ρξ , a
parameter driving the correlation in overall ability. Let σ2H, σ
2
Q, and σ
2
SS denote the
three diagonal elements of this matrix.
It is likely that for the individuals in our dataset the ability to acquire particular
skills, ξ, will be correlated with the signals of occupational aptitude, θ. Individuals
who have a higher verbal ability than quantitative ability in school might perceive
relatively more encouraging signals about their productivity in the legal profession.
However, the relationship between schooling talent and occupational fit is not readily
captured in a small number of parameters. There are three human capital types that
get used in different ways in twelve occupations. Imposing a simplifying relationship
could arbitrarily constrict the data in unintended ways and unintentionally sway the
estimation. To avoid prejudicing the results in this way and to keep the number of pa-
rameters manageable, we maintain throughout that the two vectors are independent.
This independence, however, does not imply zero correlation between abilities and
the propensity of agents to work in particular occupations. For example, if writing
well is a skill demanded from lawyers, students with high writing ability will tend to
be lawyers, even though the correlation between writing ability and the noisy signal
of the student’s future productivity as a lawyer is zero. The reason is simply because
high ability implies a relatively low cost of acquiring the skill. Choosing optimally, the
student will put the skill to work in a profession where the skill is used intensively.
The cost function for acquiring skills is assumed to be additive and quadratic
C(ξ, h) = ∑
k∈{H,Q,SS}
eξkh2k ,
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while the production technology is Cobb-Douglas22
f j(h) = ∏
k∈{H,Q,SS}
h
αj,k
k , ∑
k∈{H,Q,SS}
αj,k = 1.
Set βγ equal to 0.91 and fix γ to be consistent with average earnings growth ob-
served in the data, around 7.5% per year, resulting in values for γ and β equal to 1.071
and 0.85, respectively. As a result of these assumptions and normalizations, the vector
of parameters23 for estimation is given by
Λ =
{
{αj,H, αj,Q}
12
j=1, {σǫj}
12
j=1, {σξk}k∈{H,Q,SS}, ρξ ,π, σθ
}
.
4.1 Estimation Methodology
We use a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach to estimate the 42 elements
of the structural parameter vector. Let Λˆ denote the parameter estimates and Ωˆ the
associated estimated covariance matrix. The first step is to choose a vector of auxil-
iary moments from the HS&B dataset, denoted by Υ, which describe statistics about
occupational transitions, skills portfolios across occupations, the dispersion of (log)
earnings, and correlations across skills. Given a value of the structural vector Λ, the
model can be solved and simulated. This simulation yields a model-analog for the vec-
tor Υ, denoted by Υˆ. The estimate Λˆ is then the value of Λ that solves the following
22There is little information to guide our choice for a cost function. In results not reported here we
assess the robustness of deviating from a quadratic specification by assuming an exponential function.
Similarly, the available data do not allow estimation of the elasticity of substitution among different
human capital types within an occupation. Although we impose Cobb-Douglas payoffs, we also esti-
mated results assuming for CES production. In both instances, the results are robust to these alternative
specifications.
23By the constant-returns assumption, the weight of the third skill type is given once we know the
other two.
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criterion: 24
Λˆ = argmin
Λ
(Υ − Υˆ)′(Υ − Υˆ)′.
Standard numerical routines solve this minimization problem. To provide a sense
of the amount of uncertainty surrounding our estimates, numerical standard errors are
computed following Gourinchas and Parker (2002):
Ωˆ = (Hˆ′ΛHˆΛ)
−1Hˆ′ΛΩΥˆHˆ
′
Λ(Hˆ
′
ΛHˆΛ)
−1, (1)
where Hˆ′Λ is the Jacobian matrix of the vector-valued function H(Λ) = Υˆ− ΥΛ evalu-
ated at Λ = Λˆ. In other words, the ijth element of HˆΛ is hˆij = ∂(Υj − Υˆj)/∂Λi . ΩΥˆ is
the variance matrix of the set of moments in Υˆ.
Table 5 displays the statistics found for Υ. The columns labeled ωH and ωQ re-
port average shares of a skill type - humanities and quantitative - in an individual’s
portfolio, averaged across individuals in a given occupational group. The ωH column
corresponds approximately to the “Share of Humanities” moment reported in Table 1.
The column ωQ corresponds to “Share of Quantitative ” in Table 1.
25 The last column
of Table 5 reports the share of individuals that began their labor market career in a
given occupation but switched in the second year. These shares range from a high of
about one half in Service to a low of 5.1% for Engineers.
The two vectors of average shares for the two human capital types, ωH and ωQ,
identify the 24 technological parameters αj,H and αj,Q, j = 1, ...12. The fractions of indi-
viduals who leave an occupation after one year identify the 12 variances, σ2ǫj , associated
with each occupation j = 1, . . . , 12. Occupations in which updates to the productivity
signals have a large variability will experience a larger fraction of transitions. The
24In general, the criterion contains a weighing matrixW:
Λˆ = argmin
Λ
(Υ − Υˆ)′W(Υ − Υˆ)′
All results shown below assume all moments carry equal weight, henceW = I.
25For some occupations the values are not exactly the same across the two tables. The difference is a
consequence of having eliminated individuals who reported having ever being occupied as Owners.
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larger variability is itself a consequence of being more likely that the Gittins index for
those volatile occupations, after they are explored, falls below the second-best Gittins
index.
Eight aggregate moments complete the set of moments that comprise the parameter
vector Υ. The standard deviation of (log) earnings across all individuals in the first year
of labor market experience identifies σθ , which is the main driver of income differences
(in levels) in the first year. Measures of the dispersion across individuals’ portfolio
shares of the three different skills helps identify the three diagonal elements of Σξ .
The moment labeled percentage of “Stay-Switch Events” is defined as the fraction of
workers whose occupational choice is the same in periods 1 and 2 but different in
period 3. That fraction in the data is 8.8% (of all workers, not of all switchers). Finally,
we also target the three cross-correlations in credits across skills.
In principle one could include the model-analog coefficients shown in Table 3 as
additional moments in the estimation and formally test the over-identifying restric-
tions. We have decided not to do so as they involve the variable δ. While δ provides
an intuitive measure of distance or the degree of hedging against adverse shocks, it is
imperfect and somewhat arbitrary. It is neither a conceptually clean benchmark nor an
object that arises naturally in the model. As a consequence we leave the regression co-
efficients in Table 3 outside of the estimation procedure. In the next section, however,
we examine the model-analog to the reduced-form coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 using
our estimated structural parameters.
Given a vector of structural parameters Λ, we simulate labor market histories for a
large number of individuals by taking a (ξ, θ) draw from the abilities and productiv-
ity signals distributions. Given these draws and a portfolio of skills, we solve for the
expected earnings by finding the optimal sequence of occupational switches for each
possible update of the productivity signals. The optimal portfolio is the one which
maximizes the difference between the maximum expected earnings in the labor mar-
ket and the cost of purchasing it. This procedure yields the optimal portfolio of one
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individual as well as a randomly selected simulated labor market history. Repeating
those steps for a large number of individuals provides the model-analog to the mo-
ments in the vector Υ(Λ). The appendix provides further details of this estimation
routine.
5 Results
5.1 Parameter Values
Table 6 reports the elements of Λˆ, alongwith their estimated numerical standard errors.
These parameters tend to be tightly estimated. Dispersion in the productivity update
for Other Professionals (σˆǫPro f−Other) is one exception. The estimated standard error is
nearly three times the parameter estimate. A second exception is the estimated hu-
manities component in production function for Computer Technicians, αˆTech.−Comp,H.
The associated standard error is one and a half larger than the parameter estimate.
Otherwise, the standard errors of the other parameters are generally small relative to
the estimates.
Notice as well that the estimated Cobb-Douglas shares roughly follow the pattern
found in the average portfolio weights across occupations. Compare αˆH and αˆQ with
ωH and ωQ in Table 5. Production displays substantial variation in the use of skills
across occupations.
Uncertainty in the post-probation fit, σˆǫ (which is related to the probability of ex-
iting an occupation) also varies considerably across occupations. Consider one of the
riskiest occupations, Professionals of the Arts. It not only has a relatively high esti-
mated standard deviation of shocks, σˆǫj = .387, but the technology is also heavily tilted
towards humanities with αˆPro f .Arts,H = 0.687. However, individuals in this profession
have portfolios with a humanities weight of only 52%. A high weight in humanities
is risky by itself as humanities is not very portable across occupations. The profession
with the second highest αˆj,H is Service, with a much smaller value of 31%. Moreover,
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the high volatility of shocks in this profession amplifies this risk leading to a high
switching probability. High turnover makes diversification all the more attractive.
Although this pattern is not so extreme in other occupations, the average portfo-
lios across individuals tends to be more balanced than the Cobb-Douglas technology
parameters, as one might anticipate from hedging behavior. Professional of the Arts,
Service, and Skilled Operatives appear to be high risk as measured by σˆǫj while Man-
agers, Medical and Other Professionals are safer. Note as well that the uncertainty in
the occupational fit is highest in those professions that emphasize humanities skills,
i.e. those with highest αˆj,H.’s
Dispersion in abilities differs across types of human capital. The ability to acquire
quantitative skills is highly concentrated (the variance is 0.217) relative to the ability to
study humanities (0.933) and especially social science (1.81). Workers appear to learn
about their true productivities relatively fast: the estimated value of π is 0.86. Finally,
the estimate of ρˆξ is -0.26. At first, this estimate might appear peculiar. The sample,
however, focuses on college students. As shown in Table 2 the distribution of credits is
concentrated. As a result, more credits in a given type of human capital will generally
imply fewer credits in other types (consistent with the three correlations shown in
Table 5). The estimated covariance reflects this feature of the data.
5.2 Goodness of Fit
The estimates in Table 6 map out an explicit as well as involved trade-off between
specialization and hedging. Before considering this trade-off further, we now exam-
ine how well the estimated model replicates outcomes observed in the labor market
that were not targeted as part of the estimation procedure. Since occupational switch-
ing and dispersion in initial earnings were targets of the estimation, the focus turns to
earnings in 1991 to assess the performance of the model. In simulations of the model,
income levels depend upon arbitrary normalizations of parameters, hence comparing
income distributions is not interesting. We therefore compare the distributions of in-
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come growth in the data and the model.
Table 7 provides statistics from the distribution of (annual) income growth, both for
the HS&B sample of students and for the estimated model. Dispersion in the observed
data exceeds dispersion in the model. The standard deviation of the distribution of
income growth in the simulated distribution is roughly 60% of that in the data. This
difference is not surprising. In reality individual earnings vary after workers settle in
an occupation. The construction of the model rules out such shocks and changes to
earnings that occur after exploration of occupations in the labor market ends.
The model rules out other possibilities. Students do not update their beliefs on their
occupational calling while at university. They also cannot update their skill set when
they switch professions. Students, of course, change majors and workers can improve
the alignment of their skills after they settle on an occupation. On the other hand,
such career learning while studying may well occur early on and thus not drastically
alter the desired make-up of acquired of skills. Many changes in majors occur when
students are just beginning their studies. Intended majors can change even before
first year enrollment. Likewise, workers who do not switch also acquire on-the-job
skills. Acquiring fundamental skills when young is often less costly, more enduring
and easier to build upon. The impact of poorly aligned skills may be long lasting.
There are many possibilities yet little direct evidence guiding these abstractions.
Despite these limitations, the model generates an earnings growth distribution with
a substantial amount of inequality that shares important characteristics with earnings
growth responses found in the HS&B survey. The minimum growth rate observed in
both distributions is similar (−0.219 in the data and −0.194 in the model). Because
the model generates a modest right tail of the distribution of earnings growth - some
individuals in the data report high positive growth rates compared to the highest val-
ues generated by the model,26 the simulated skewness is only 70% of the empirical
counterpart. On the other hand, the model generates a substantial mass of negative
26One respondent in the data reports an average annual growth rate in earnings of 63%.
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earnings growth rates (these are associated with occupational switchers), so that the
simulated kurtosis is in the ballpark to that found in the data, 5.4 versus 6.2.
To further explore the relationships among income, diversification in human cap-
ital portfolios and individual occupational transitions, Table 8 replicates the regres-
sions from Table 3 on model-simulated data. Obviously, not all of the control variables
employed in the analysis with actual data in Section 2 are available with our model-
generated output. Gender is absent in the simulated model and occupations in the
model are exclusively horizontal. There are no vertical career transitions. Hence, SEX
and CAREER do not appear in the simulated regressions. The remaining variables -
log(Y1), log(CRED), δ, and STAY - are constructed the same way as in the actual data.
To ease the comparison between model and data, the last two columns report the same
coefficients found when fitting the regression to actual data. The first two columns
display results with model-generated data.
In Table 8, the coefficient estimates from simulated data compare favorably to those
estimated from the observed data. Although the simulated data abstract from a num-
ber of factors (some are mentioned above while others involve familiar variables re-
lated to wages determination), the estimates are all roughly in line with the HS&B
empirical estimates. The coefficient on initial earnings (around 0.75− 0.85) is some-
what higher than in the data. The model generates this large and positive coefficient
because those with high initial earnings have strong signals and hence portfolios tar-
geted to the first occupation. They are less likely to switch, accruing growth for a larger
number of periods resulting in higher earnings. When we condition on switching, the
positive coefficient on STAY (0.28 which is higher than the empirical counterpart of
0.11) reflects simple selection. Those who stay in the job receive good ǫ draws and
earn more relative to similar workers who try other occupations.
Now consider the relationship between hedging, earnings, and occupational ex-
ploration. Note first that the coefficient on δ displays the same pattern as found in
HS&B data. Without controls for occupation switches, the coefficient estimates in the
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observed and simulated data are negative with large standard errors. Controlling for
mobility switches the sign of this coefficient, increases the magnitude and lowers the
standard error. For an individual who switches occupations (STAY = 0), the coeffi-
cient of δ on (log) earnings is about 0.08, somewhat lower than that found in the data
(0.16). The coefficient on the interaction term δ × STAY is lower (-0.135) in absolute
value than its empirical counterpart (-0.379) but implies that, everything else constant,
portfolio distance decreases stayers’ earnings.
Replicating Table 4, Table 9 reports Probit estimates from the model generated data
in which the probability of switching occupations is a function of the distance measure
and other observables. The first two columns of the table display coefficients when
fitted to the occupational transitions found in our model-simulated data. The last two
columns of Table 9 display the relevant estimates from the first and last columns of
Table 4. The simple model again matches up fairly well with the magnitudes of the
coefficients on initial earnings (roughly 0.5) and overstates somewhat the association
between the probability of switching and our measure of distance in the portfolios.
5.3 Counterfactual Earnings Distributions
The Υ estimates in Table 6 shape the trade-offs an individual confronts when choosing
a portfolio of skills to acquire before entering the labor market. Idiosyncratic circum-
stances embodied in the ξ and θ draws pin down these trade-offs precisely for each
individual. When deciding what and how much to study, each agent weighs up and
balances a number of personalized uncertain options.
To condense and to abstract from the individual-specific components of occupa-
tional uncertainty, we present a basic thought experiment. We quantify the impact of
restricting the portfolio choice on the distribution of earnings in the estimated model.
Agents cannot hedge as they would like. The experiment attempts to capture a feature
characteristic of European higher educations systems: their relative inflexibility when
diversifying across areas of study. A student wishing to be a biologist is given a cur-
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riculum from which there is little freedom to deviate. The baseline model resembles
an American system in which students have a relatively large degree of freedom to
diversify across areas of study.
In the experiment (labeled “Optimal Specialization”), agents specialize by choosing
their optimal portfolios as if they were to remain in that occupation forever. Let
j′ = arg max
j∈{1,...,J}
{
max
h
−C(ξ, h) + βeθj f j(h)/(1− βγ)
}
,
Let the optimal portfolio associated with this optimal occupational choice be h′ We
give h′ to individuals in the stochastic world, and construct earnings distributions.
The results of this experiment are Table 10. The first three columns present mo-
ments from the earnings distributions (growth and levels) from the simulated data
when portfolio choice is unrestricted, distinguishing between individuals who switch
occupations and those who do not. The first column reports E(∆Y), the cross-sectional
average of earnings growth. The first number for “All” corresponds to the number
reported in Table 7, 7.15%. The second and third row report the same moment for
“Switchers”, 2.79%, and for “Non-Switchers”, 8.35%. The second column reports the
standard deviation of the logarithm of earnings in the 5th period.
The model delivers an earnings distribution for “Non-Switchers” with more dis-
persion than that of the “Switchers”. This is a common feature of the simulations:
switchers experience lower growth in earnings and their distribution is relatively less
disperse. On the other hand, earnings of those who remain in their initial occupation
grow faster on average and their earnings distribution is more disperse. The stan-
dard deviation of earnings for all individuals is 0.47; for non-switchers is 0.40 and for
switchers 0.45.
Non-switchers enjoy higher earnings growth for two reasons. The first channel is
the same self-selection mechanism discussed previously that makes switching optimal
only in the event of a relatively low productivity shock. The second channel is the
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earnings growth of γ that accrues for a longer time period if individuals do not switch.
Switchers, on the other hand, enjoy lower earnings and earnings growth because they
enjoy the geometric growth rate for a shorter period of time. In addition, occupational
switches are often associated with a drop in earnings, more so in cases where the port-
folio is tailored to the departing occupation. Finally, the table also reports the fraction
of people who switch occupations; 22.50% with our estimated parameters.
The last three columns of Table 10 reports the moments of the experiment relative
to the baseline case. When individuals are endowed with portfolios chosen under
the restriction that they must specialize the fraction of switchers falls. This reduction
is expected. Having a portfolio of skills precisely tailored to a particular occupation
reduces the attraction of trying a new one. Switchers experience large drops in average
growth rates. Average income growth of non-switchers also falls albeit much less than
the switchers, as now more individuals who experience low shocks are inclined to
remain in the first occupation. Taken together, average incomes also fall.
Table 11 reports results for the same experiment when we relax the assumption of
unit-elasticity of substitution among human capital types. In the baseline case we im-
pose a unit-elasticity (i.e. Cobb-Douglas) and here assume that payoffs take the form
of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. All other parameters are fixed
at their estimated values. The table reports percentage changes relative to values ob-
tained with the CES function when portfolio choice is unrestricted. The table shows
that the quantitative implications of the experiment are amplified by the lower elas-
ticity of substitution. Inequality found in the cross-sectional variability of earnings
falls with forced specialization. Inequality falls for switchers because the threat of a
larger income drop makes it optimal to “settle early” in an occupation. As a result,
the average number of switches falls, lowering dispersion of earnings. Cross-sectional
inequality among non-switchers also falls.
The mechanism generating this result is subtle. It is clear that with specialized
portfolios occupational switches are more costly. The higher cost prevents individuals
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from trying high-risk occupations hoping to get a large productivity draw. With the
unrestricted portfolio that option is relatively more attractive to workers because their
fallback option is not as dismal as with the specialized portfolio. As a consequence the
upper tail in the earnings growth distribution is absent in the counterfactual relative
to the baseline. It is this upper tail in growth and hence in earnings that is responsible
for the higher inequality among non-switchers in the baseline case. Consistent with
the results displayed on the table, this effect is stronger, the lower the elasticity of
substitution among human capital types.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper assesses the way in which the composition of workers’ skills interact with
labor market uncertainty to determine the evolution of earnings. Human capital con-
sists of a portfolio of imperfectly substitutable skills acquired through formal edu-
cation. Different potential occupations value these skills differently and uncertainty
about one’s fit in any particular occupation introduces uncertainty in the investment
decision. A trade-off arises between acquiring specialized skills targeted for a particu-
lar occupation and acquiring a package of skills that diversifies the risk across occupa-
tions.
Individual-level data on the amount of college credits across different subjects and
labor market dynamics in early careers reveals that income is higher for the more spe-
cialized individuals who do not switch occupations whereas income is higher for more
diversified individuals who switch occupations.
To further evaluate the tension between specialization and diversification, we con-
struct and estimate a portfolio choice problem that features an interaction between
skills, abilities, and uncertain labor market outcomes. The model replicates the basic
patterns observed in the individual data and generates a sizable amount of inequality.
Counterfactual earnings distributions found by endowing individuals with portfolios
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chosen under certainty about occupational fit illustrate that the underlying stochastic
structure generates large effects both on the income growth distribution and the vari-
ance of earnings.
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Table 1: Empirical Human Capital Portfolios By Occupation
(1991)
Occupation Share Hum. Share Quant. Share Soc. Sci.
Clerical 0.263 0.268 0.469
(0.195) (0.216) (0.196)
Manager 0.221 0.290 0.489
(0.153) (0.223) (0.203)
Skilled Op. 0.181 0.497 0.322
(0.094) (0.284) (0.235)
Prof. Arts 0.492 0.132 0.376
(0.215) (0.088) (0.181)
Prof.- Medical 0.227 0.427 0.347
(0.125) (0.223) (0.201)
Prof. - Eng. 0.098 0.760 0.142
(0.076 ) (0.152) (0.111)
Prof. - Other 0.231 0.281 0.488
(0.165) (0.186) (0.209)
Owner 0.175 0.259 0.565
(0.165 ) (0.206) (0.186)
Sales 0.244 0.239 0.517
(0.140) ( 0.151) (0.158)
School Teacher 0.330 0.285 0.385
(0.199) (0.206) (0.223)
Service 0.321 0.238 0.442
(0.185) (0.171) (0.154)
Tech. Comp 0.141 0.586 0.273
(0.150) (0.272) (0.208)
Tech. Non Comp 0.260 0.400 0.340
(0.177) (0.237) (0.213)
All Occupations 0.236 0.333 0.431
(0.175) (0.250) (0.217)
Notes: Each cell displays the average, across all individuals working in an occupation, of the
portfolio weight of a given human capital type. The standard deviation of the distribution of
the portfolio weight across individuals are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - Selected Variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
δ 0.276 0.238 0.164 0.018 0.848
log(Y91) 8.275 8.295 0.405 6.147 9.722
∆Y 0.077 0.058 0.117 -0.219 0.632
CRED 124 122 27 80 362
WCRED 259.3 225.6 108.6 104.9 849.6
STAY 0.620 1.000 0.486 0.000 1.000
Notes: Before computing growth rates, we deflated earnings by the Consumer
Price Index for the appropriate year.
Correlation Matrix - Selected Variables
δ log(Y91) ∆Y CRED WCRED STAY
δ 1.000 −0.040∗ −0.003 0.114∗∗ 0.270∗∗ −0.054
log(Y91) 1.000 0.353
∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.057
∆Y 1.000 0.008 −0.013 0.149∗∗
CRED 1.000 0.770∗∗ 0.076∗
WCRED 1.000 0.095∗∗
STAY 1.000
Notes: *: Correlation is significant at least at the 0.05 level. **: Correlation is significant at least at
the 0.01 level.
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Table 3: OLS Regression Results - Dependent Variable is log(Y91)
Coeff.
(p-val.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Y1) 0.506 0.516 0.504 0.502
(nil) (nil) (nil) (nil)
log(CRED) 0.052 0.058 0.061 0.056
(0.096) (0.065 ) (0.050) ( 0.071)
SEX -0.091 -0.092 -0.094 -0.092
( 6.8× 10−5 ) (6.0× 10−5 ) ( 3.5× 10−5) (4.9× 10−5)
δ -0.079 -0.089 -0.063 0.164
(0.242) ( 0.186) ( 0.344) ( 0.115)
STAY -0.052 −7.1× 10−4 0.112
(0.026) (0.978) (0.018)
CAREER 0.164 0.178
(−3.1× 10−5) (6.8× 10−6)
δ× STAY -0.379
(0.004)
Intercept 4.097 4.019 4.045 4.015
(nil) (nil) (nil ) (nil)
N 880 880 880 880
R2 0.347 0.353 0.366 0.372
Notes: CAREER equals one if an individual begins her labor market experience in a non-
managerial occupation and ends in a managerial occupation.
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Table 4: Probit Regression - Dependent Variable : STAY
Coefficient Estimate
(p-val.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ -0.402 -0.371 -0.555 -0.419
(0.112) ( 0.149) (0.038) ( 0.098)
log(Y1) 0.540 0.521 0.483
(−1.1× 10−7) (−3.2× 10−7) (nil)
log(CRED) 0.339 0.279
(0.007) (0.183)
SEX -0.028
(0.755)
Intercept 0.417 -3.915 -5.563 -5.458
(−5.6× 10−7) (−1.8× 10−6) (nil) (−6.0× 10−7)
Notes: The table displays the coefficients of four alternative specifications of a Probit model with
STAY as the dependent variable.
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Table 5: Elements of the Vector Υˆ
Occupation Sample Size ωH ωQ % Switch
Clerical 150 0.264 (0.017) 0.269 (0.019) 0.222 (0.015)
Manager 260 0.221 (0.010) 0.289 (0.014) 0.155 (0.008)
Skilled Op. 20 0.181 (0.026) 0.497 (0.079) 0.250 (0.057)
Prof. Arts 30 0.492 (0.037) 0.132 (0.015) 0.189 (0.027)
Prof- Medical 50 0.226 (0.018) 0.433 (0.032) 0.048 (0.007)
Prof - Engineer 40 0.098 (0.012) 0.760 (0.024) 0.051 (0.008)
Prof - Other 120 0.231 (0.016) 0.281 (0.018) 0.102 (0.009)
Sales 90 0.244 (0.015) 0.239 (0.016) 0.202 (0.018)
School Teacher 40 0.330 (0.032) 0.285 (0.033) 0.212 (0.028)
Service 10 0.321 (0.062) 0.238 (0.057) 0.529 (0.088)
Tech. Comp. 80 0.141 (0.017) 0.586 (0.031) 0.152 (0.015)
Tech. Non Comp. 20 0.260 (0.044) 0.400 (0.059) 0.263 (0.051)
Sample Size
Standard Deviation (Log) Earnings
First Period 860 0.438 (0.011)
Standard Deviation ωH 860 0.176 (0.004)
Standard Deviation ωQ 860 0.251 (0.006)
Standard Deviation ωSS 860 0.218 (0.005)
%“Stay-Switch Events” 860 0.088 (0.002)
ρ(CREDSS,CREDQ) 860 -0.151 (0.033)
ρ(CREDSS,CREDH) 860 -0.047 (0.034)
ρ(CREDH ,CREDQ) 860 -0.401 (0.029)
Notes: Each cell reports a sample moment, either a mean or a standard deviation, and in parentheses an estimate of the standard deviation
of that sample moment. In the upper panel we report, for each occupation, the mean portfolio shares in Humanities and Quantitative Skills,
and the fraction of Switchers in the first period. In the lower panel, we report the standard deviations of (Log) Earnings in the initial period,
the cross-sectional standard deviation for the portfolio shares in each skill type, the fraction of “Stay-Switch Events” (see main text for an
explanation of how the statistic is computed) and the cross-sectional correlations among the different human capital types. We also report
the sample size used to compute each sample moment.
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Table 6: Estimation Results
Occupation αˆH αˆQ σˆǫ
Clerical 0.182 (0.028) 0.441 (0.027) 0.161 (0.055)
Manager 0.156 (0.038) 0.405 (0.112) 0.088 (0.027)
Skilled Op. 0.145 (0.078) 0.738 (0.014) 0.221 (0.092)
Prof. Arts 0.687 (0.018) 0.153 (0.021) 0.387 (0.016)
Prof- Medical 0.136 (0.049) 0.664 (0.157) 0.075 (0.014)
Prof - Engineer 0.038 (0.020) 0.918 (0.078) 0.210 (0.067)
Prof - Other 0.140 (0.007) 0.478 (0.024) 0.102 (0.291)
Sales 0.162 (0.007) 0.464 (0.048) 0.170 (0.132)
School Teacher 0.228 (0.038) 0.428 (0.056) 0.167 (0.012)
Service 0.307 (0.121) 0.424 (0.015) 0.415 (0.130)
Tech. Comp. 0.111 (0.161) 0.792 (0.116) 0.149 (0.022)
Tech. Non Comp. 0.180 (0.058) 0.664 (0.029) 0.174 (0.144)
Estimate (Std. Error)
σθ 0.258 (0.052)
σ2ξH 0.933 (0.030)
σ2ξQ 0.217 (0.009)
σ2ξSS 1.811 (0.042)
π 0.861 (0.042)
ρξ -0.254 (0.042)
Notes: This table reports the estimated value for each element in Λ, the vector of structural parameters.
In parenthesis, we report numerical standard errors computed using (1).
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Table 7: Income Growth Distribution Summary - Model vs.
Data
Min. 1st. Quart. Median Mean 3rd Quart.
Data -0.219 0.0139 0.0577 0.0774 0.1184
Model -0.1562 0.0296 0.0651 0.0715 0.1030
Max. Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt.
Data 0.6315 0.1159 1.2421 6.1649
Model 0.4908 0.0653 0.8980 5.4849
Notes: The table compares some moments in the income growth
distribution from the HS&B dataset with a model-simulated
(9,000 individuals) income growth distribution. The sample of
students used to compute the Data moments are the same 950
individuals reported in Table 5.
Table 8: Regression Results - Model-Simulated
Final Wage (log(Y91))
Coefficient Estimate
(p-val.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Y1) 0.826 0.739 0.506 0.502
(nil) (nil) (nil) (nil)
log(CRED) 0.119 0.184 0.052 0.056
(nil) (nil) (0.096) (0.071)
δ -0.022 0.082 -0.079 0.164
(0.436) (0.0789) (0.242) (0.115)
STAY 0.277 0.112
(nil) (0.018)
δ× STAY -0.135 -0.379
(0.011) (0.004)
Intercept 0.309 0.101 4.097 4.015
(nil ) (nil ) (nil ) (nil)
N 9,000 9,000 880 880
R2 0.751 0.799 0.347 0.303
Notes: The first two columns of the table shows results from re-
gressing income growth (∆Y) on the variables shown in column
1 for the sample of individuals. The last two columns replicate
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 3 to ease the comparison between data
and model.
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Table 9: Probit Regression Results - Model-Simulated
Occupational Stayers vs. Switchers (STAY)
Coefficient Estimate
(p-val.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ -0.956 -0.909 -0.402 -0.419
(nil) (nil) (0.112) (0.098)
log(Y1) 0.585 0.483
(nil) (nil)
Intercept 0.918 -0.095 0.417 -5.458
(nil) (0.001) (−5.6× 10−7) (−6.0× 10−7)
N 9,000 9,000 880 880
Notes: The first two columns of the table display results of fitting a Probit
model to model-simulated STAY. The last two columns display the same
estimates as the first two columns of Table 4 for ease of comparison between
data and model.
Table 10: Baseline and Counterfactual Earnings Distributions: Cobb-Douglas Payoffs
,
Baseline Counterfactual
E(∆Y) σ(log(Y91)) %Switchers E(∆Y) σ(log(Y91)) %Switchers
All 0.0715 0.4647 22.5 -10.35 -0.1 -12.90
Switchers 0.0279 0.3935 -38.96 1.93
Non-Switch. 0.0835 0.4410 -5.65 -0.52
Notes: The left-side panel (first three columns) reports moments of the baseline earnings distribution. The right-side panel
(last three columns) summarizes the earnings distribution when agents are forced to specialize as described in the text. Both
model-generated distributions come from the same cross-section of 9,000 individuals.
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Table 11: Counterfactual Earnings Distributions: CES Payoffs
ρ = −0.15 ρ = −1.15
E(∆y) σ(log(y1991)) %Switch. E(∆y) σ(log(y1991)) %Switch.
Optimal
Specialization
All -2.64 -0.69 -13.10 -6.13 -1.74 -14.09
Switchers -28.24 -4.74 -26.33 -1.36
Non-Switch. -2.23 -0.88 -6.57 -2.25
Notes: The table reports the percentage changes when the same 9,000 individuals in the cross-section are forced to specialize
as described in the text. The percentage changes are calculated relative to the unrestricted-portfolio case when the elasticity of
substitution between human capital types is given by 11−ρ for ρ = −0.15 and ρ = −1.25.
A Appendix (For Online Publication)
A.1 Data
Merging the PETS and Sophomores in 1980 - HS&B datasets yields an initial sample of
8,395 students. Dropping those who do not have an associates degree or who have a
doctorate / advanced professional degree (doctors and lawyers, primarily) eliminates
3,637 individuals. Deleting those with missing data on earnings, employment status,
or occupation reduces the sample to 2,499 individuals.
To account for possible unemployment spells which may distort measures of an-
nual earnings, dividing annual earnings by number of months employed yieldsmonthly
earnings for all years in the sample, 1986-1991. Individuals reporting negative or zero
monthly earnings for a given year are dropped as are individuals who report work-
ing in one of the following occupations: farmer, laborer, protective services, and the
military.
To find portfolios, human capital is partitioned into three broad areas of knowledge:
Quantitative (Q), Social Sciences (SS), and Humanities (H). Each of these areas is the sum
of credits taken in areas of study belonging to that area of knowledge.
• Q=Non-Additive Pre-College LevelMath+Credits in College-LevelMath +Cred-
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its in Calculus and Advanced Math+ Other Math Credits from Math Depts.+
Credits in all Statistics Courses + Credits in Science + Credits in Engineering +
Credits in Computer Science + Credits in Computer-Related Courses
• H = Total Credits in Humanities Courses + Total Credits in Arts and Performing
Arts.
• SS = Total Credits in Business Courses + Total Social Science Credits + Credits in
Basic Communications Courses
Students with less than 80 credits or those who report missing values for credits in
any of the four categories are dropped.27
This procedure reduces the sample to 1,360 students with complete labor market
histories - average earnings per month and occupation for given year - plus a descrip-
tion of their human capital investments. The total number of credits in the three areas
of knowledge (and consequently the vector of portfolio weights ω) summarize these
human capital investments.
The year of graduation further reduces the sample. Students who graduated in ei-
ther 1988, 1989, 1990, or 1991 are dropped because despite reporting labor market his-
tories, from the perspective of the model those histories are irrelevant. In the model,
we analyze histories after investing in human capital and therefore discard labor mar-
ket histories contemporaneous to those human capital investments. Discarding such
histories leaves a total of 920 students.
The OLS regressions reported in Table 3 in Section 2 use a truncated sample of 880
students; students in the bottom and top 2 percentiles in the earnings growth distribu-
tion are dropped.
27The PETS dataset provides no direction on what subjects exactly constitute each of the definitions
included in the main four areas of knowledge. They provide a definition for each of the variables used
to avoid the double-counting of credits as much as possible. For instance, in the categories of human-
ities credits, they include Foreign Languages, but they report as a separate category credits in Foreign
Languages.
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Students who becomeworkers are grouped into broader occupation categories than
those defined in the original HS&B dataset. For example, in the original HS&B there
are four categories of managers, three categories for owners, and three categories for
clerical workers. We group them all into “Managerial”, “Owner”, and “Clerical” cate-
gories. This aggregation reduces the number of occupations (increases the sample size
and therefore decrease the degree of sampling error) in the empirical analysis.
Finally, because the Sophomores of 1980 data set is not as widely used in the eco-
nomics literature as other panels such as the PSID, NLSY, or SIPP, we compare the
unconditional distribution of income by year fromHS&Bwith Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) data. Figure A-1 displays kernel-smoothed estimates of the annual (nomi-
nal) earnings distribution from the CPS and the HS&B. Since the objective is to assess
the overall quality of the survey, the figure includes all respondents, not just the sub-
sample of relatively-higher educated individuals. To get the appropriate population
in the CPS we restricted it to those respondents having roughly the same age as the
respondents in the HS&B. The figure illustrates that except for the lower levels of earn-
ings in 1986 and 1987, the two distributions are comparable for the remaining years. If
anything, it seems as if the CPS shows a large mass of individuals with unreasonably
low levels of annual earnings.
A.2 Model Solution and Estimation
Given a value for the structural vector of parameters Λ, the following algorithm de-
scribes the solution of the model described in the text.
• For a given individual, draw a vector θ (productivity signals) and ξ (abilities).
• For a given value of the portfolio h, compute the cost function C(h, ξ).
• To compute the expected value in the labor market, proceed as follows:
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– Compute initial Gittins indices {Mj(θ, h,∅)}. The indices provide a rank-
ing initial occupational choices. Standard integration routines are used to
compute the indices.
– For t = 2, T, (where T = 100) simulate an individual’s labor market history
by (a) sampling a uniform random variable; learning takes place when the
draw is larger than π and, (b) updating the productivity values by sampling
from the appropriate log-normal distribution. This labor market history pro-
vides a discounted value of earnings.
– Repeat the previous step NH = 500 times, yielding NH possible labor market
histories.
– The expected value of an individual in the labor market is given by the av-
erage of the NH labor market histories appropriately discounted.
– Find the optimal portfolio by maximizing the difference between expected
labor market earnings and the cost.
• Using a random draw from a uniform distribution, sample a labor market history
(occupations and earnings).
These steps determine the optimal portfolio and a sequence of earnings and occu-
pational transitions for a given individual i. Repeating the same steps (independently)
for a large cross-section of individuals (the number used in the estimation is 9,000
individuals) yields a distribution of earnings, growth rates of earnings, occupational
choices and optimal portfolios.
This distribution provides the elements of the vector Υˆ. A typical element of that
vector is a statistic from that distribution of a panel of individuals. We use a Nelder-
Mead algorithm to find the minimizer Λˆ of the criterion function (A-1).
Λˆ = argmin
Λ
(Υ − Υˆ)′(Υ − Υˆ) (A-1)
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We use forward-difference numerical differentiation to compute the Jacobian matrix of
the criterion function. After finding the Jacobian, evaluating (1) is straightforward.
A.3 Additional Results
The following two tables display the same least-squares regressions as those shown
in Tables 3 and 4 (i.e. the baseline regression with 1991 income as the lef-hand side
variable and the Probit regression with STAY as the left-hand side variable). The only
difference pertains to the number of human capital types. Instead of lumping the cat-
egory “Fine and Other Performing Arts” credits into Humanities, here we consider
those two types as separate categories. As a result, the number of types is K = 4.
Given the results are quantitatively similar to the case where K = 3, the conclusions
and inferences drawn in the main text carry over to this specification.
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Table 12: OLS Regression Results - Dependent Variable is
log(Y91)
Coeff.
(p-val.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Y1) 0.504 0.514 0.502 0.500
(nil) (nil) (nil) (nil)
log(CRED) 0.131 0.137 0.128 0.118
(0.021) (0.014 ) (0.022) ( 0.033
SEX -0.083 -0.083 -0.086 -0.084
( 3.7× 10−4 ) (3.5× 10−4 ) ( 1.8× 10−4) (2.5× 10−4)
δ -0.055 -0.062 -0.035 0.194
(0.393) ( 0.333) ( 0.582) ( 0.054)
STAY -0.051 -0.001 0.114
(0.026) (0.959) (0.015)
CAREER 0.159 0.174
(−5.5× 10−5) (1.1× 10−5)
δ× STAY -0.385
(0.003)
Intercept 3.757 3.677 3.760 3.744
(nil) (nil) (nil ) (nil)
N 880 880 880 880
R2 0.351 0.355 0.367 0.373
Notes: CAREER equals one if an individual begins her labor market experience in a non-
managerial occupation and ends in a managerial occupation.
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Table 13: Probit Regression - Dependent Variable : STAY
Coefficient Estimate
(p-val.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ -0.393 -0.351 -0.387 -0.386
(0.114) ( 0.165) (0.129) ( 0.131)
log(Y1) 0.539 0.517 0.515
(−1.1× 10−7) (−4.3× 10−7) (nil)
log(CRED) 0.394 0.386
(0.072) (0.085)
SEX -0.014
(0.878)
Intercept 0.416 -3.913 -5.612 -5.535
(−5.6× 10−7) (−1.8× 10−6) (−7.1× 10−6) (−4.0× 10−5)
Notes: The table displays the coefficients of four alternative specifications of a Probit model with
STAY as the dependent variable.
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Figure A-1: Comparison of unconditional annual earnings distributions in the CPS
and the HS&B.
51
